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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
\V ALTER LARSON, ALEIDA P. 
LARSON and JON LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
ROBERT GEORGE EVANS, M.D., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9365 
BRIEF OF APP'ELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs brought this action to recover dam-
ages against the defendant for personal injuries and 
property damage growing out of an automobile accident 
at the intersection of Evergreen Avenue and 23rd East 
Street on the evening of October 23, 1958, at approxi-
mately 8 :50 p.m. 
Plaintiffs appeal to this court from a jury verdict of 
no cause of action based upon its finding that plaintiff 
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Jon Larson, the driver of the automobile in which the 
plaintiffs were riding, was contributorily negligent, and 
that such contributory negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident and plaintiffs' injuries. The lower 
court also held that the negligence of Jon Larson was 
imputed to the other plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The undisputed facts in this case, as determined by 
the lower court and set forth in the pretrial order (R. 14-
17), establish that the accident complained of occurred 
at the intersection of Evergreen Avenue and 23rd East 
Street in Salt Lake County on October 23,1958, at approx-
imately 8:50p.m., and that traffic entering said intersec-
tion from Evergreen A venue was controlled by a stop 
sign at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs were pro-
ceeding north on 23rd East Street in an automobile driven 
by Jon Larson, one of the plaintiffs. The defendant was 
driving west on Evergreen A venue. 
The testimony in the case was not contdictory and, 
even viewing it in the most favorable light for the defend-
ant, consisted of the undisputed facts hereinafter set 
forth. The defendant testified that he was proceeding 
at 30 miles per hour or less and that he did not see the 
stop sign controlling his entrance to 23rd East Street 
and that he did not stop, or attempt to stop, in obedience 
to the stop sign. (R. 116, 117, 120, 124, 404). He even 
admitted that he considered the accident to he his own 
fault at the trial below (R. 124, 404) in addition to 
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making such admission to others at the scene of the acci-
dent. (R. 136, 174). The defendant testified that his speed 
at the time of impact was 20 miles per hour. (R. 119). 
Based upon the a hove admissions the court instructed the 
jury that the defendant was negligent as a matter of 
law. (R. 68). 
With respect to the physical nature of the intersec-
tion as it existed at the time of the accident the evidence 
clearly indicated that a dense five or six-foot hedge and 
house obscured from the vision of the plaintiffs all west-
bound traffic approaching 23rd East on Evergreen 
A venue. The existence of such hedge, as shown on plain-
tiffs' Exhibit P-1 to extend along the south side of Ever-
green Avenue to within a few feet of the edge of 23rd 
East, was confirmed by the defendant (R. 121), Deputy 
Sheriff Clifford J. Gunn (R. 127, 422), Clifford A. Coon 
(R. 136-137), Jon Larson (R. 175), and Alice Taggart 
(R. 366-367). The defendant admitted that the hedge 
obscured his vision of the northbound Larson vehicle on 
23rd East. (R. 121). Deputy Sheriff Clifford J. Gunn 
testified that one could not see through the hedge because 
of its density on the night of the accident. (R. 422). 
The width of Evergreen Avenue was established at 
24 feet by Deputy Sheriff Gunn (R. 416) and plaintiff 
Jon Larson (R. 411). The right front of the Larson 
vehicle collided with the left front of the defendant's 
automobile at a point 21 feet 5 inches north from the 
projected south boundary of Evergreen A venue as each 
driver swerved to avoid the collision after which both 
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vehicles came to rest facing north in the west or south-
bound traffic lane of 23rd East Street. (Exhibits P-1, P-4). 
Deputy Sheriff Gunn testified that the Larson vehicle laid 
down 40 feet of skid marks prior to the point of impact 
(R. 128, 417) and that these skid marks commenced 13 
feet 8 inches south of the obstructing hedge on Ever-
green Avenue. (R. 420). Deputy Sheriff Gunn also testified 
that the skid marks indicated the speed of the Larson 
vehicle to be 30 miles per hour and, therefore, the normal 
reaction distance would be 33 feet from the time the driver 
was alerted to danger to the point at which the skid marks 
commenced, resulting in a total distance of 73 feet from 
the moment the driver of the Larson vehicle was alerted 
to his peril to the actual point of impact. (R. 419-420). The 
Deputy Sheriff also stated that there were no skid marks 
left by defendant's automobile (R. 130, 417) and that 
there were no skid marks after the point of impact. 
(R. 416). 
Jon Larson testified that he was proceeding north 
on 23rd East Street at approximately 25 miles per hour 
which was corroborated by Mrs. Larson. (R. 171, 173, 197, 
229). He testified on direct examination that he applied 
his brakes the instant that he saw the defendant's car 
and that the car he was driving and the defendant's car 
entered the intersection at about the same time. (R. 171). 
When asked what attracted his attention to the defend-
ant's automobile he stated that the first thing he saw 
were headlights which he could see for about 2 seconds, 
and that it appeared that the other car ''was coming quite 
fast." (R. 173). With respect to the location of defend-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ant's automobile when he first saw it, Jon stated that it 
would have been the point at which the defendant's car 
first became visible to him. (R. 172). On cross-examina-
tion he testified that, to the best of his knowledge, the 
rectangles designated as "E-1" and "L-1" on Exhibit 
"P-1" represented the location of the defendant's auto-
mobile as well as the one he was driving at the moment 
he first saw the defendant's automobile. (R. 197-198). 
He also stated that he did not actually recall applying his 
brakes although he must have done so as shown by the 
testimony of Deputy Sheriff Gunn. (R. 199). With respect 
to one's faculty for memory under the circumstances of 
this accident, Dr. Paul Milligan, who was called as a wit-
ness for the defendant, testified that the combined factors 
of an accident resulting in a broken leg to a loved one 
could produce a state of shock to one who had suffered 
neck injuries in the same accident, and that such a state 
of shock could result in mental confusion and a failure to 
remember clearly the events precipitating the condition. 
(R. 399). 
The defendant himself testified that, because of the 
hedge on the south side of Evergreen A venue, he did not 
see the Larson vehicle until it was toward the front of 
him and that he wasn't aware of any danger until he had 
reached a point in the vicinity of the stop sign on Ever-
green Avenue as shown on Exhibit "P-1." (R. 121, 118). 
Alice Taggart, a passenger in the defendant's automo-
bile, testified that both cars were in the intersection when 
she first noticed danger. (R. 365). 
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The court submitted interrogatories to the jurors for 
their determination as to whether Jon Larson was negli-
gent in the operation of the Larson automobile in that 
he (a) failed to keep a proper lookout, (b) did not have 
his car under control, or (c) was driving too fast for exist-
ing conditions. The jurors answered "yes" to said inter-
rogatory and found that the negligence of Jon Larson was 
the proximate cause of the accident and plaintiffs' in-
juries. (R. 82-83). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE 
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN SUB~HTTING THE QUESTION OF JON LAR-
SON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE 
JURY. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST-
ED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN PAGES 
27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE 430 OF THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3 FOR THE REASON THAT IT 
WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION 
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUC-
TION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE 
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF JON LAR-
SON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE 
JURY. 
It is a basic hornbook law that there must be substan-
tial evidence of negligence to sustain a verdict of negli-
gence. It is also elementary that evidence which makes 
the question of negligence a matter of mere surmise, con-
jecture, or speculation, or which gives rise merely to a 
possibility of negligence, does not justify submission of 
the case to the jury. See 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, §332, 
P. 1031; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, §1178; 65 C. J. 8., N egli-
gence, §253, P. 1141. Furthermore, a case should not be 
left to the jury if the evidence is as consistent with the 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
absence of negligence as with its existence. See 65 C. J. S., 
supra., footnote 57, for authorities so holding. 
The lower court submitted the following interroga-
tory to the jury in instruction No. 17, which was answered 
affirmatively by the jury: 
'' 2. Was the plaintiff, Jon Larson, negligent in 
the operation of the Larson automobile at the 
time of the accident in one or more of the follow-
ing contentions~ 
(a) That he failed to keep a proper lookout 
for traffic entering 23rd East and Ever-
green A venue. 
(b) That he did not have his car under 
control. 
(c) That he was driving too fast for existing 
conditions.'' 
An examination of the record in this case fails to dis-
close any evidence whatsoever upon which the court was 
justified in submitting the above interrogatory, or any 
part thereof, to the jury. Let us consider the first con-
tention relating to the failure of Jon Larson to maintain a 
proper lookout. The only evidence upon which such a 
finding could he based was the testimony of Jon Larson 
that, to the best of his recollection, his automobile, as 
well as the defendant's automobile, had entered the inter-
section when he first saw the defendant's automobile. 
This testimony, however, is clearly shown to be subject to 
the frailty of memory and contrary to the physical evi-
dence (with justification) under the circumstances and 
trauma of this accident as they affected Mr. Larson. The 
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defendant's O\\·n witness, Dr. Milligan, testified that the 
combined factors of the accident, together with the injur-
ies suffered by the driver and his knowledge of serious 
injuries to loved ones, such as that suffered by his mother 
in the accident, could produce a state of shock resulting 
in mental confusion and a failure to clearly remember 
the events precipitating the accident. That this is so is 
graphically illustrated by the fact that Mr. Larson also 
testified that he did not actually recall applying his 
brakes, although it was not disputed, and the evidence is 
conclusive, that the automobile he was driving laid down 
40 feet of skid marks prior to the point of impact. This 
latter fact was established without contradiction through 
the testimony of the deputy sheriff who investigated the 
accident. The same investigating officer presented undis-
puted evidence that such skid marks, together with reac-
tion time, established that the driver of the Larson vehicle 
had actually reacted to his visual observations of appar-
ent danger at a point 46 feet 8 inches south of the hedge 
which was located on the south side of Evergreen Avenue 
at its intersection with 23rd East Street. Under these 
circumstances the lower court should have resolved the 
testimony consistent with the physical facts and the other 
testimony of the witness. Indeed, this court has held 
that in weighing the testimony of an individual witness, 
consideration should not be restricted to isolated portions 
thereof, but all of the witness' testimony, including that 
given on direct and on cross-examination, should be con-
sidered as whole . .Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 
2d 986, citing Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80 U. 
187, 14 P. 2d 973, 981. On cross-examination Jon Larson 
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stated that the skid marks were caused by his car. 
(R. 199). On direct examination he stated that he saw 
the defendant's vehicle at the very moment that it could 
have become visible to him (R. 172), and that he recalled 
seeing headlights for approximately 2 seconds. (R. 173). 
In view of the above physical evidence it is the plain-
tiffs' contention that the testimony of Jon Larson, upon 
which the interrogatory relating to proper lookout was 
submitted, could not be given such probative value by the 
lower court as to sustain the verdict of the jury as a mat-
ter of law. It is the general rule, and the rule in this 
state, that testimony which is contrary to uncontroverted 
physical facts, does not constitute substantial evidence. 
Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 U. 552, 262 
P. 101; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, §1183; 32 C.J.S., Evidence, 
§1031(c). 
The undisputed physical evidence indicates that Mr. 
Larson, who had the right of way, observed some threat 
to his continued course of travel northward on 23rd East 
at a point some 46 feet south of the hedge bordering 
Evergreen and that he reacted in the normal manner by 
immediately applying his brakes. These facts indicate a 
remarkable sense of awareness and defensive care on the 
part of ~1r. Larson. Especially is this so in view of the 
existence of the 5 or 6-foot hedge and house that ob-
structed his view of Evergreen A venue entirely. Even 
the defendant testified that the density of the bushes on 
the south side of Evergreen was such that he was not 
aware of any danger and did not see the Larson vehicle 
10 
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until both vehicles ha.d entered the intersection. (R. 118-
(121). The defendant's passenger, Alice Taggart, also 
testified that both cars were in the intersection before she 
sensed danger which she attributed partly to the exis-
tence of the aforementioned shrubbery. (R. 365-366). Cer-
tainly, if the defendant's view southward was obliterated 
by the hedge, Mr. Larson's northward view of Evergreen 
Avenue was likewise blocked. Under such uncontroverted 
circumstances Mr. Larson's statement that he did not see 
the defendant's car until both had entered the intersec-
tion is undoubtedly true as being the only physical pos-
sibility under the circumstances. HOWEVER, the 
aforementioned physical facts of a previous awareness 
of danger are even greater testimony of the extreme 
standard of care actually exercised by Mr. Larson, and 
his frankness in asserting facts from impaired memory 
which do not entirely comport with the undisputed 
physical evidence should not, under any circumstances, 
serve as the executioner to his cause of action, as well 
as that of the other plaintiffs, on the gangplank of con-
tributory negligence. Certainly such statements could 
not, and should not, be held to establish a '' preponder-
ance" of the evidence. See Stickle v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 122 U. 477, 251 P. 2d 867, and Ray v. Consolidated 
Freightways, 4 U 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196. 
This court has held that contributory negligence is 
a question of law where the evidence shows, with such 
certainty that reasonable minds could not differ thereon, 
that the conduct in question either met or failed to meet 
the standard of due care. Cooper v. Eva;ns, 1 U. 2d 68, 
11 
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262 P. 2d 278; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, §255. And, notwith-
standing that contributory negligence is ordinarily a 
question of fact, where undisputed facts lead reasonable 
minds to one conclusion, the court must declare such 
conclusion as a matter of law. Maybee v. Maybee, 79 U. 
585, 11 P. 2d 973. This court has also held that (1) an 
instruction must be based on evidence ; ( 2) it is preju-
dicial error to submit a charged act of negligence to a 
jury for its consideration in the absence of evidence tend-
ing to support a finding that the act occurred; (3) a 
court may not permit a jury to speculate on evidence; and 
( 4) a finding of fact cannot be based on surmise, con-
jecture, guess, or speculation. Olsen v. W arwood, 123 U. 
111, 255 P. 2d 725, and cases therein cited. To allow the 
jury to consider the question of whether or not Jon 
Larson maintained a proper lookout for traffic entering 
23rd East on Evergreen A venue under the undisputed 
physical facts and evidence in this case does violence 
to every rule above set forth. Such a, ruling would result 
1n the realization of a practice clearly denounced by 
Judge Wolfe in the case of Paulyv. McCarthy, 109 U. 398, 
166 P. 2d 501, 513-514, where he cited Lord Cairns in 
Metropolitan Ra.ilway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cases 193, 
197, 47 L. J. C. P. 303, as follows: 
''The judge has a certain duty to discharge, and 
the jurors have another and a different duty. The 
judge has to say whether any facts have been 
established by evidence from which negligence 
may be reasonably inferred, the jurors have to say 
whether, from those facts, when submitted to them, 
negligence ought to be inferred. It is, my opinion, 
of the greatest importance in the administration 
12 
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of justice that these separate functions should be 
maintained, and should be maintained distinct. It 
would be a serious inroad on the province of a 
jury, if, in a case where there are facts from which 
negligence may reasonably be inferred, the judge 
were to withdraw the case from the jury upon the 
ground that, in his opinion, negligence ought not 
to be inferred; arnd it would, on the other hand, 
place in the ha~nds of the jurors a power which 
might be exercised in the most a,rbitrary marnn,er, 
'if they were at liberty to hold that negligence 
might be inferred from any state of facts what-
ever." (Latter emphasis added.) 
It necessarily follows from the above, as a matter of 
law, that the lower court erred in submitting the question 
of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury on the 
basis of improper lookout for the following reasons: (1) 
there was no evidence whatsoever upon which to base 
such a finding, (2) there was no substantial evidence 
upon which to base such a finding, (3) there was no pre-
ponderance of evidence upon which to base such a find-
ing, ( 4) reasonable minds could not differ upon the evi-
dence in this case as to the exercise of due care by Jon 
Larson, ( 5) it clearly allowed the jury to speculate on the 
evidence, (6) it allowed the jury to base a finding of fact 
on surmise, conjecture, guess, or speculation, (7) the 
only evidence upon which such a finding could have been 
found was as consistent, and even more consistent, with 
the absence of negligence than with its existence, and (8) 
it left to the province of the jury the power to ''hold 
that negligence might be inferred from any state of facts 
·whatever.'' For the reasons the verdict and judgments 
are improper as a matter of law. 
13 
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It might we well to here point out that the trial 
judge, in a memorandum opinion denying the plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial, assumed that the evidence indi-
cated, and that the plaintiff driver had admitted, that 
he could see the lights of the defendant's car through 
the thick, high hedge, and that the jury, therefore, might 
believe that Jon Larson, after seeing the car lights 
through the hedge, ''gave no further thought to what 
was happening on his right, until the instant before the 
collision." (R. 102). Such an assumption as to the evi-
dence is absolutely incorrect and has no basis in the rec-
ord of this case whatsoever. The evidence was conclusive 
that, on the night of the accident, auto lights could not 
be seen through the hedge from the point where the 
Larson vehicle commenced laying down skid marks. Fur-
thermore, the possible jury conclusion which the trial 
judge indulged from the assumed facts is absolutely 
contrary to, and refuted by, the physical evidence of con-
tinued skid marks to the joint of impact. The trial court's 
declaration would allow the most flagrant type of specu-
lation by the jury upon the evidence. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision also rec-
ognized the holding in Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U. 2d 435, 326 
P. 2d 722, and cited Justice Crockett's concurring opin-
ion therein to the effect that '' ( t )he verdict, when sup-
ported by substantial evidence should be regarded as 
presumptively correct and should not be interfered with 
merely because the judge might disagree with the result.'' 
(Emphasis added). It is the plaintiff's contention that, 
in view of the authority of H aarstrich v. Oregon Short 
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lfin.e R. Co., supra, which holds that testimony contrary 
to undisputed physical facts does not constitute substan-
tial evidence, the lower court applied the doctrine of 
Holmes incorrectly in this case. 
Secondly, the court instructed the jury to consider 
the question of whether Jon Larson had his car under 
control in determining the existence of contributory neg-
ligence. There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record 
that would warrant that portion of the instruction. The 
undisputed physical evidence, as set forth hereinabove, 
indicated the plaintiff driver's awareness and prudent 
reaction to the circumstances confronting him. Even the 
defendant admitted that the plaintiff driver attempted to 
avoid the accident (R. 116) thereby implying the latter's 
control over the vehicle while he was driving. Insofar as 
the evidence of the speed of the Larson car is related to 
the control exercised by the driver over the vehicle, the 
subject shall be hereafter explored in the next suc-
ceeding paragraphs. 
Lastly, the jury was charged with the responsibility 
of determining whether the plaintiff driver was driving 
too fast for existing conditions as an element of contribu-
tory negligence. The lower court placed considera hie 
emphasis upon the combination of skid marks, the force 
of the collision and the distance plaintiff's car traveled 
after impact as evidence for the jury to evaluate upon 
the question of speed. (R. 103). The fatal error of the 
court in this regard is the total absence in the record of 
any evidence of the prevailing speed limit or the reason-
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able speed under the conditions then prevailing upon 
23rd East Street. The weather was clear, the roads dry, 
and there was no traffic on 23rd East approaching from 
the north. ( R. 405). The only evidence in the record of 
the speed of the Larson automobile prior to the accident 
is Jon Larson's testimony, corroborated by that of his 
mother, that he was traveling 25 miles per hour and the 
testimony of Deputy Sheriff Gunn that the skid marks 
revealed a speed of 30 miles per hour for the Larson auto. 
It was undisputed that the speed of the defendant's auto-
mobile was at least 20 miles per hour at the time of the 
impact (R. 119) which would account for considerable 
force in the actual collision and would likewise add a for-
ward movement to the plaintiffs' automobile following 
impact by reason of the ultimate common direction of 
both vehicles and the free-wheeling of the vehicles result-
ing from the release of brakes caused by the impact itself 
as evidenced by the lack of skid marks following the point 
of impact. Certainly, the damage to the vehicles and 
their location following the point of impact is as con-
sistent with the absence of negligence on the plaintiff 
driver's part as with its existence. See 6'5 C.J.S., N egli-
gence, §253, footnote 57. BUT, even assuming that such 
evidence is sufficient to indicate additional speed of the 
Larson vehicle, there is no evidence to indicate the amount 
of any such additional speed and no evidentiary guide 
whatsoever for the jury to follow in determining what 
speed was reasonable and prudent under the conditions 
and with regard to the actual and poteintia.l hazards then 
existing as required by Section 41-6-46, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended. 
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The pnma facie speed limit on 23rd East Street 
south of Evergreen A venue could be as high as 50 miles 
per hour so far as the evidence in this case is concerned 
and bearing in mind that this accident occurred at night. 
[t is submitted that perhaps this court will take judicial 
notice of the ordinances of Salt Lake County which estab-
lished the prima facie speed limit upon this street at 35 
miles per hour on the night in question. In any event, it 
is clear that the jury had no sufficient evidence upon which 
to make a determination as to the excessiveness or unrea-
sonableness of the speed of the Larson vehicle and it was 
the defendant's duty to provide the evidence upon which 
such a :finding could be made by the jury. The jury was 
thus allowed by the lower court to resort to the most 
flagrant speculation, conjecture and guessing in arriving 
at the standard of a reasonable speed to apply to the oper-
ation of the plaintiffs' automobile on the night in question. 
The following statement of Justice Pratt in his dis-
sent in Horsley v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 P. 2d 592, is 
most appropriate: 
''To hand the jury various speeds and various 
distances and ask them to select which is reason-
able and which is unreasonable without giving 
them an evidentiary standard upon which to base 
their selection, is to ask them to speculate. In the 
majority of the cases, it will result in their rea-
soning backward from the resultant accident that 
the speed at which they conclude the driver was 
going must have been unreasonable or else the 
accident would not have happened. Such reason-
ing by its very nature assumes the proximate 
cause element; * * * '' 
17 
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Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a motor 
vehicle within the speed limit prescribed by statute or 
ordinance except under special circumstances such as 
fog limiting visibility or ice and snow upon the road. See 
Lochhead v. Jensen, 42 U. 99, 129 P. 347; Shields v. 
Ramon., 122 U. 474, 251 P. 2d 671; Horsley v. Robinson, 
Supra; H un.ter v. Michaelis, 114 U. 242, 198 P. 2d 245; 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. There can 
be no question that special circumstances, such as fog, 
ice or snow did not exist on the night of the subject acci-
dent so as to limit the general rule above stated. How-
ever, the evidentiary yardstick, i. e., the prima facie 
speed limit, was unavailable to the jury in their delibera-
tions upon the evidence in this case. It necessarily fol-
lows that the jury could do nothing but speculate as to 
what would constitute an excessive or unreasonable 
speed for the Larson auto under the conditions then 
prevailing. Such a result is clearly proscribed in Olsen v. 
W arwood, supra. The rule was succinctly stated in Alva-
rado v. Tucker, supra, as follows at page 988 of 268 
P. 2d: 
''The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the 
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could 
not be based on mere speculation or conjecture, 
but only on a preponderance of the evidence. This 
means the greater weight of the evidence, or as 
sometimes stated, such degree of proof that the 
greater probability of truth lies therein. A choice 
of probabilities does not meet this requirement. 
It crea.tes only a basis for conjecture, on which a 
verdict of the jury canrnot starnd." (Emphasis 
added). 
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The only standard of a speed limit that could be ap-
plied under the evidence in this case would be that set 
forth under the statute, namely 50 miles per hour. And 
it is certain beyond any doubt that the evidence in this 
case would not warrant a finding of the plaintiffs' speed 
in exceess of that speed limit. Indeed, the evidence would 
not sustain a finding of plaintiffs' speed in excess of 30 
miles per hour, and most certainly not in excess of 35 
miles per hour. Therefore, it was error for the lower 
court to submit the question of the plaintiffs' speed to the 
jury for their determination with respect to the con-
tributory negligence of Jon Larson. 
It follows from the above that each and every con-
tention relating to the possible contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff Jon Larson was not sustained, as a matter 
of law, by the evidence and, therefore, the court erred in 
submitting the special interrogatories contained in In-
struction No. 17 to the jury. It likewise must be con-
cluded that the verdict and judgment rendered thereon 
are not sustained by the evidence as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST-
ED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN PAGES 
27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL 
AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE 430 OF THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
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Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth 
under Point I and for the reasons therein set forth urge 
this court to set aside the verdict and judgment of the 
lower court and order said court to grant the plaintiffs a 
new trial solely for the purpose of ascertaining the 
amount of damages suffered by each individual plaintiff 
and that the lower court enter judgment for plaintiffs in 
accordance with such findings. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set 
forth under POINTS I, IV and V. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3 FOR THE REASON THAT IT 
WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION 
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUC-
TION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Instruction No. 3 given by the lower court com-
menced by charging the jury that the defendant was 
negligent as a matter of law. In the very next paragraph 
therein the court proceeds to instruct the jury upon the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff Jon Larson and 
the effect of the same upon the remaining plaintiffs. 
(R. 68). It is too clear for argument that each instruc-
tion related to matter totally disconnected from the other. 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In fact one part of the instruction related to the theory 
of the plaintiff on one distinct question and the other 
portion related to the theory of the defendant upon a 
completely separate question. The net result would very 
likely result in confusion to the jury and, in this par-
ticular case, could have resulted in the application of the 
plaintiffs' theory of the case, i.e., negligence as a matter 
of law, to the conduct of the plaintiff Jon Larson by the 
jury. And, although this court has held that the respective 
theories of both parties upon a single proposition, may 
be embodied in a single instruction, Toon.e v. J. P. 0 'Neill 
Construction. Co., 40 U. 265, 121 P. 10, it has never es-
poused a rule which would allow the theories of the par-
ties upon unrela.ted propositions to be included within 
the same instruction. Quite to the contrary this court 
has held that a judge may not give an instruction which 
will tend to confuse the jury in the consideration of the 
issues in the case. Riding v. Roylance, 63 U. 221,224 P. 
885. As to misleading and confusing instructions gen-
erally see 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §555. Furthermore, it is 
generally held that it is good practice to embody each 
separate proposition of law in a single instruction and 
that the blending of separate and distinct legal proposi-
tions in the same instruction is bad form. Rocky Moun-
tainMotor Co. v. Walker, 71 Colo. 53,203 P. 1095; H. & S. 
Theatres Co. v. Hamp·ton, 300 Ky. 677, 190 S. W. 2d 39. 
In view of the inherent confusion in the named 
instruction as to the respective liabilities of the parties 
under separate propositions of law and its very possible 
prejudicial effect upon the jury's consideration of the 
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plaintiffs' case, it is submitted that this court should 
reverse the ruling of the lower court upon this point and 
grant the plaintiffs a new trial even if this court should 
disagree with the appellants on Point I. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. 
Instruction No. 8 reads as follows : 
''The party upon whom the burden of proof 
rests must sustain it by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The law does not permit you to base a 
verdict on speculation or conjecture as to the 
cause of the collision in question. If the evidence 
does not preponderate in favor of the party mak-
ing the charge of negligence, then that party has 
failed to fulfill his burden of proofand your find-
ing must be against the party on that issue. In 
other words, if after considering all of the evi-
dence, it should appear to you just as probable 
that the party charged with negligence was not 
negligent or that he was, or that his negligence, 
if any, was not a proximate cause of the collision, 
or that it was such a proximate cause, then a case 
has not been established against him by a prepon-
derance of the evidence as the law requires." 
(Emphasis added) 
In a previous instruction the court had directed that the 
defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Without 
limiting the application of the above instruction to the 
claimed contributory negligence of plaintiff Jon Larson, 
the jury was free to reconsider the existence of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant and was, in fact, invit-
ed to do so. When the court had determined that the 
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defendant was negligent as a matter of law it clearly was 
error thereafter to instruct the jury on negligence and 
whether or not they should determine its existence with-
out limiting its application to the only remaining party 
charged with acts of negligence. Under this instruction 
the jury could conclude that it must find, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the defendant was in fact 
negligent. This is manifestly inconsistent with the prior 
instruction and, therefore, is sufficient ground for re-
versal. State v. W aid, 92 U. 297, 67 P. 2d 647; Konold v. 
Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 U. 379, 60 P. 1021, 81 Am. St. 
Rep. 693. In the latter case the court stated the rule as 
follows at page 1025 of 60 P. Reporter : 
"Instructions on a material point in the case 
which are inconsistent or contradictory should not 
be given. The giving of such instructions is error, 
and a sufficient ground of reversal, because it is 
impossible, after verdict, to ascertain which in-
struction the jury followed, or what influence the 
erroneous instruction had in their deliberation. 
This has been so uniformly held that citations are 
unnecessary.'' 
See also Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 U. 366, 270 P. 349. 
This court, in the W aid case cited the rule set forth in 
65 C. J. 671, §600, as follows: 
''It is proper to refuse, and error to give con-
flicting and contradictory instructions, since a 
charge containing two distinct propositions con-
flicting with each other tends so to confuse the 
jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelli-
gent verdict, the jury cannot be required to deter-
mine what part of a contradictory charge is cor-
rect, or left to reconcile conflicting principles of 
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law; it ordinarily cannot be determined from the 
verdict which rule was adapted by the jury, the 
court is left in doubt and uncertainty as to the 
facts actually found by the jury as a basis for its 
verdict, and where instructions are inconsistent 
with, or contradict, each other, it is usually im-
possible to say whether the jury were controlled by 
the one or the other.'' 
See also 88 C.J.S., Trial, §339. 
The case of Morrison v. Perry, 104 U. 151, 140 P. 2d 
772, is not only in point on the law, but also on the facts. 
In that case it was held that instructions that if a person 
drove an automobile in a certain manner he was negli-
gent, and that if he drove in that manner the jury was 
to determine whether or not he was negligent, were 
conflicting and erroneous in that the instructions per-
mitted the jury to decide that acts negligent as a matter 
of law were not negligent. The giving of such instructions 
was held to constitute error in that case. 
Upon the above authority it would appear unrefu-
table that the giving of Instruction No. 8 by the lower 
court was reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the undisputed evidence in this case, the 
duty imposed upon the plaintiff driver by the lower 
court was such as required of him a standard of care 
which would preclude his involvement in a moving auto-
mobile accident at any intersection, regardless of the 
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traffic control devices there employed and the observance 
of the same by the other drivers, without calling in issue 
his own contributory negligence. Such was the effect of 
letting the jury consider the driver's honest but under-
standably erroneous statements, which were contrary to 
the undisputed physical eidence, upon the issue of his 
own negligence. The net result was the anomalous ver-
dict of the jury which necessarily had to be based upon 
unsubstantial evidence and against the great preponder-
ance of the evidence contrary to law. In addition it 
allowed the jury to speculate upon the evidence and to 
resort to surmise, conjecture or guesswork in reaching 
its verdict upon evidence which was clearly more con-
sistent with the absence of Jon Larson's negligence than 
with its existence. 
The complete absence of any evidence of Jon Lar-
son's lack of control over his vehicle at the time of the 
accident, together with the absence of any evidence of 
excess speed on the part of the Larson vehicle, particu-
larly in view of the failure of the defendant to establish 
any speed standards in the record, absolutely invalidated 
the instruction and interrogatories of the trial court on 
the issue of the plaintiff driver's contributory negligence. 
Surely there could be no more classic example of allow-
ing a jury to infer negligence from "any state of facts 
whatever" than has been done in this case. The evidence 
is complete. The negligence of the defendant is established 
as a matter of law. The absence of contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff driver has been estab-
lished as a matter of law. There remains only the 
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determination to be made of the damages suffered by 
the plaintiffs. This court should, therefore, set aside 
the verdict and judgment of the lower court and remand 
the ca.se to that court for a jury determination upon the 
question of damages only after which a judgment should 
be entered for plaintiffs in accordance therewith. 
It must also he concluded, as a matter of law, that 
the lower court erred in submitting to the jury Instruc-
tion No. 3 which incorporated a charge that the defend-
ant was negligent as a matter of law with a totally un-
related instruction upon the open question of Jon Lar-
son's contributory negligence. Such an instruction is 
fraught with possibilities for confusion and incorrect 
application of the law by the jury, and the court should 
here determine that the giving of Instruction No. 3 was 
reversible ·error. 
Finally, it is absolutely clear that the giving of In-
struction No. 8 had the effect of allowing the jury to 
reconsider the negligence of acts which had already been 
determined negligent as a matter of law by the court 
and, because it is impossible to determine what effect 
this had upon the deliberations of the jury, the judgment 
of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DONN E. CASSITY, 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. 
JACK L. CRELLIN, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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